Information, Knowledge, and Attitudes: An Evaluation of the Taxpayer Receipt by Barnes, L et al.
IS H O R T A R T I C L EInformation, Knowledge, and Attitudes:
An Evaluation of the Taxpayer Receipt
Lucy Barnes, University College London
Avi Feller, University of California, Berkeley
Jake Haselswerdt, University of Missouri
Ethan Porter, George Washington UniversityTo better understand the relationship between information and political knowledge, we evaluate an ambitious govern-
ment initiative: the nationwide dissemination of “taxpayer receipts,” or personalized, itemized accounts of government
spending, by the UK government in fall 2014. In coordination with the British tax authorities, we embedded a survey
experiment in a nationally representative panel. We ﬁnd that citizens became more knowledgeable about government
spending because of our encouragement to read their receipt. Although baseline levels of political knowledge are indeed
low, our ﬁndings indicate that individuals are capable of learning and retaining complex political information. However,
even as citizens became more knowledgeable, we uncover no evidence that their attitudes toward government and redistri-
bution changed concomitantly. The acquisition and retention of new information does not necessarily change attitudes. Our
results have implications for citizens’ capacity to learn and research on the relationship between knowledge and attitudes.n 2014, the United Kingdom mailed 26 million taxpayers
“taxpayer receipts” for the ﬁrst time. The receipts itemized
government spending over the previous year, personalized
for each recipient. What changed when citizens were exposed
to this information?Were there effects on political knowledge
and attitudes? More broadly, can people increase their polit-
ical knowledge about complex policy matters, and does in-
creased knowledge coincide with attitude change? To shed
light on such questions, we administered a ﬁeld experiment in
coordination with the UK tax authorities during the distri-
bution of the receipts. We found that, while the receipts in-
creased political knowledge, they had no effect on related at-
titudes.
Our ﬁndings contribute to an ongoing debate about po-
litical knowledge. On the one hand, there is ample reason to
doubt that citizens are capable of learning about complex
policy matters. Political scientists have long been skepticalLucy Barnes (l.barnes@ucl.ac.uk) is a lecturer in comparative politics at Universit
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information (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Others have
argued that such skepticism is overstated and that, indeed,
citizens can learn (Gerber and Green 1999). We examine an
actual policy intervention to show that citizens are capable of
learning outside the laboratory. Our effect sizes come close
to approximating those observed in the lab studies of Prior
and Lupia (2008). We also show that the increase holds over
the medium run. However, the increase in knowledge does
not appear to coincidewith attitude change.Citizens can learn,
but we ﬁnd no evidence that they change their minds as a
result.
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quire combining assimilation with an evaluation, and policy
preferences require the application of both of these to a choice
over a government action. This distinction reﬂects recent ex-
perimental ﬁndings, which indicate that while knowledge and
attitudes may be elastic to the provision of information, pref-
erences over policy are much more difﬁcult to move (Grigo-
rieff, Roth, and Ubfal 2016; Kuziemko et al. 2015).
It is tempting to view the relationship between knowledge
and information as straightforward, with the latter acting
as a necessary condition of the former. Yet scholarship on
motivated reasoning makes clear that the relationship is not
always straightforward. Subjects will often seek out new in-
formation to reach conclusions that accord with their prior
preferences (Lodge and Taber 2013). In lab studies, only the
most aggressive techniques—described as “hitting subjects
between the eyes”—have occasioned increases in knowledge
(Kuklinski et al. 2000). There is even some evidence that
presenting subjects with factual information will cause them
to become further entrenched in their prior misperceptions
(Nyhan and Reiﬂer 2010). While the “backﬁre effect”may be
overstated (Wood and Porter 2018), in general the litera-
ture encourages some skepticism about the capacity of citi-
zens to learn new information.With that inmind, we examine
whether taxpayer receipts can increase knowledge about the
government budget.
In terms of attitudes and preferences, we focus on out-
comes closely related to the information provided by the re-
ceipts. First, we consider attitudes toward trust and fairness.
Then we consider preferences over taxation: views on taxes
paid by the respondents themselves and taxes on high- and
low-income households. The expectations of transparency
advocates, aswell as literature on the “submerged state,”drive
the expectation that the taxpayer receipt will make citizens
evaluate government more favorably and support higher
taxation (Mettler 2011).
However, the motivation for the taxpayer receipt in the
UK, its introduction by Conservative politicians, and its sup-
port from advocates of low taxation and small government
highlight an alternative expectation. The design of the re-
ceipts, emphasizing the size of tax payments, individual con-
tributions to debt interest payment, and the itemization of
the indirect taxes not included in the receipt speak to the
primary goal of highlighting costs to individuals, rather than
the beneﬁts of government. This underpins alternative hy-
potheses for attitudes and preferences based on ﬁscal illu-
sion: that government will be evaluated less favorably when
citizens see its costs directly (Buchanan 1977).
Substantively, our work echoes Cook, Jacobs, and Kim
(2010), who exploit the birthday-based distribution of So-This content downloaded from 128.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms cial Security statements in the United States to investigate
the relationship between political knowledge and related atti-
tudes. However, our results diverge from theirs, as we discuss
below.
HYPOTHESES
We preregistered all hypotheses discussed here and speci-
ﬁed their operationalization more fully, in the preregistration
database Evidence in Governance and Politics (E-GAP). We
have the following hypotheses:
H1. The taxpayer receipts will increase knowledge
about the government budget.
H2. The receipts will change subjects’ attitudes toward
government,a) increasing their trust in government, their per-
ceptions of value for money and of fairness.
b) decreasing their trust in government, their per-
ceptions of value for money and of fairness.
H3. The taxpayer receipts will change policy prefer-
ences,
a) increasing support for (or acquiescence toward)
taxation.
b) decreasing support for (or acquiescence toward)
taxation.
The expectations of “good-for-government” effects come from
the literature on transparency (hypothesis 2a) and the sub-
merged state (hypothesis 3a), whereas negative effects might
be expected given the political emphasis on costs and waste
underpinning the statements’ introduction in the British case.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY: THE UK TAXPAYER RECEIPTS
Before the distribution of the receipts in mid-November
2014, we ﬁelded an initial survey wave, asking questions about
knowledge, attitudes, and preferences (as described below).
We also accessed demographic characteristics such as edu-
cation, region, and income. At the end of the survey, a ran-
dom subset of our panelists received encouragement to read
the receipts that would soon be arriving in the mail. In early
December, new messages were sent to all respondents: those
in the treatment group were reminded that they were part of
a study concerning the receipts; those in the control group sim-
ply were reminded that they were part of an ongoing study.
The ﬁnal survey wave was administered from the end of De-
cember to the ﬁrst week in January, immediately after all the41.061.032 on May 23, 2018 10:14:35 AM
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group were told that the survey was part of the study that they
were enrolled in, while subjects in control were told that they
would answer questions about “important social and political
matters.” We repeated the same survey questions from wave 1
and additionally asked whether respondents recalled receiving a
receipt over the previous sixweeks. Figure 1 shows an example of
the receipt, which was sent to every pay-as-you-earn taxpayer.1
YouGov UK was responsible for implementing the sur-
vey and collecting responses. Via a nationally representative
online panel, 2,529 subjects completed the survey in wave 1;
2,072 subjects did so in wave 2.2 Subjects who were not eli-
gible to receive a receipt were excluded from the study.1. Pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) is the British equivalent of withholding
from wage and salary income in the US federal income tax.
2. We observe modest differential attrition across treatment groups.
As we show in the appendix, available online, correcting for this via in-
verse probability weighting (Gerber and Green 2012) leaves the results
essentially unchanged.
This content downloaded from 128.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms There are two strengths of our approach. First, we exam-
ine the impact of an actual policy intervention. This mitigates
questions about realism that hinder many lab- and survey-
based approaches. The provenance of the information—arriv-
ing on the doormat with the ofﬁcial imprimatur of HMRC—
may make recipients more attentive to it and give it more
credibility. Second, we examine outcomes in themedium run,
instead of immediately asmost lab and survey experiments are
forced to do. Only 4% of our respondents who recalled re-
ceiving a receipt recalled doing so within the previous week;
about one-quarter each reported a two, three, or four week
interval between receipt and survey.
We maintain experimental control via an encouragement
design (see, e.g., Sovey and Green 2011). Comparing the out-
comes of interest in wave 2 for individuals across experi-
mental conditions yields an intent-to-treat estimate. In this
case, the intent to treat holds the primary substantive interest,
as government will have difﬁculty forcing compliance with in-
formation dissemination. We pair the encouragement with anFigure 1. Example tax statement for a taxpayer with annual income of £60,00041.061.032 on May 23, 2018 10:14:35 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
3. Linear models of the attitude and preference outcomes yield simi-
larly null results.
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to increase compliance and accuracy (Prior, Sood, andKhanna
2015). This may raise the concern that the incentive contrib-
utes more directly to our results than the treatment. As dis-
cussed in the appendix, our sensitivity analysis cautions against
this interpretation, as does the weakness of the incentive. But
for those who remain skeptical, the policy signiﬁcance of our
results remain: a small incentive to read a complex govern-
ment document can improve political knowledge.
OPERATIONALIZATION AND MEASUREMENT
OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES
We used three questions, all with the same structure, to mea-
sure knowledge.We asked: “Over the past twelve months, what
percentage of the tax money that you paid would you say the
government actually spent on X?” where X is overseas aid, na-
tional defense, or health. Subjects provided numerical estimates.
We use these answers to construct an index of knowledge. We
code as “correct” any response that lies within 5 percentage
points of the true value (i.e., the range of correct responses is
10 percentage points). For example, the share of the budget
spent on defense was 5.4%, meaning that any answer between
0.4 and 10.4 would be coded as correct. We think that the
knowledge necessary to hold government accountable is bet-
ter operationalized categorically, so we prefer the 10 percentage
point window as a measure of knowledge to a continuous mea-
sure of the difference between the estimate and the true value.
As we show in the appendix, our results are not sensitive to the
precise cutoff we use, and we draw similar substantive conclu-
sions looking at individual knowledge items.
Our attitude measures relate to respondents’ evaluations
of various government characteristics. We ask whether re-
spondents feel that people like them are treated fairly by
government and whether they can trust the government to
do what is right. We ask whether they think tax money is
wasted and whether the government provides good value for
money. For a response somewhat closer to actual behavior,
we also ask whether tax avoidance can be justiﬁed.
Finally, we measure three kinds of attitudes on taxation
to capture policy preferences. First, we ask whether respon-
dents think their own tax burden is too high. Then, we ask
about progressivity: we ask respondents whether tax rates
for the top income quintile should be higher than rates for
the middle and lowest income quintiles (these are the “tax
on rich” and “tax on poor” variables). For all variables, we re-
code the responses so that higher values correspond to more
pro-government (higher trust, lower evaluation of waste) or
more pro-redistribution (supportive of progressive rates and
higher levels of tax) views. With the exception of the question
about waste (which has three possible outcomes), all the atti-This content downloaded from 128.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms tude and preference questions yield responses on a ﬁve-point
scale.
RESULTS
On average, respondents in the encouragement group of-
fered 1.01 correct answers in the second wave, while those in
the control group gave 0.90 correct answers, a difference of
0.11 (pp :012, SEp :044). These simple averages are dis-
played graphically in ﬁgure 2. The ﬁgure also shows that the
overall number of correct answers increased between the ﬁrst
and second waves.
Although the experimental groups are balanced on a range
of demographic and political variables, there is mild imbal-
ance in political knowledge in the ﬁrst wave. We therefore
estimate the impact of encouragement controlling for pre-
treatment covariates and wave 1 knowledge. The estimated im-
pact of the encouragement is 0.07 correct answers (pp :036,
SEp :035), comparable to the unadjusted estimate. See ap-
pendix table 4 for additional details.
We also conduct a standard manipulation check. In the
encouragement group, 29% of respondents recalled receiving
the taxpayer receipt, compared to 24% of the control group
(pp :025). This is a meaningful, if modest, increase. Finally,
we use ordinal logistic regression to assess the impact of the
encouragementonattitudeandpreferenceoutcomes,asshown
in ﬁgure 3.3 The point estimates for all the attitude and pref-Figure 2. Comparing means: treatment and control groups before and after
the distribution of the taxpayer receipts.41.061.032 on May 23, 2018 10:14:35 AM
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tional levels of statistical signiﬁcance.4
Our ﬁndings diverge from Cook et al. (2010), whose anal-
yses indicate that assignment to receive a Social Security state-
ment increases conﬁdence that beneﬁts will be available later
but has no effect on knowledge.5 But our results broadly rep-
licate recent ﬁndings which show that citizens can increase
their quantity of complex political knowledge.Ourﬁndings do
not depend on highly controlled laboratory settings; instead,
they are observed in the real world, thanks to an actual pol-
icy intervention. And in that same setting, we offer evidence
showing that knowledge increases do not necessarily coin-
cide with related attitude change.
CONCLUSION
Citizens can gain complex political knowledge not just in
tightly controlled laboratory settings but also in the real world.
Indeed, the increaseweobserve approximates the lower bound
of the knowledge gain estimated by previous laboratory re-
search (Prior and Lupia 2008). The widespread dissemination4. We note that this absence of evidence of effects on attitudes and
preferences is not itself evidence of absence: imprecision in the estimates
means that we cannot rule out changes in attitudes or preferences smaller
than 0.16 on the scale of the linear predictor, or 1.18 in odds ratio terms.
5. They also ﬁnd that recalling the statement, conditional on assign-
ment to receive it, has positive effects on both, but since recall itself is not
randomly assigned, this is not directly comparable to our ﬁndings here.
This content downloaded from 128.0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms of ﬁscal facts by government can improve public knowledge of
the budget, including those items that are notoriously mis-
construed. At the same time, we ﬁnd no evidence that this
increased knowledge is accompanied by change in related at-
titudes, although we cannot rule out modest effects. Impor-
tantly, we reach these conclusions by assessing a real-world
policy intervention.
Our ﬁndings should encourage advocates of government
transparency, as well as those who argue that pessimism about
citizens’ capacity to learn is overstated. Simply by receiving
personalized information in the mail about otherwise com-
plex topics, people can be made more knowledgeable. When
policy makers provide more information about ﬁscal matters
to citizens, recrimination is not inevitable. Instead, citizens
can learn without also changing their related attitudes. The
provision of budget information should and can be an issue
of good governance and the cultivation of an educated citi-
zenry, not partisan politics.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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